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INTRODUCTION
A colony is "a territory, subordinate in various ways-political, cultural, or
economic-to a more developed country. Supreme legislative power and much
of the administration rest[s] with the controlling country, which [is] usually of a
different ethnic group from the colony."' That the relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico falls squarely within this definition-and is thus a
colonial one-cannot seriously be questioned.'
This Article will discuss and analyze the constitutional validity of the United
States-Puerto Rico colonial relationship as sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
the Insular Cases.' These cases authorized the colonial regime created by Con-
gress, which allowed the United States to continue its administration-and ex-
ploitation-of the territories acquired from Spain after the Spanish-American
War of 1898. It is my view that this regime, in effect to the present day, has since
its inception contravened the Constitution, constitutional precedent, and long-
established historical practice. In addition to discussing the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the Insular Cases, this Article, in keeping with the definition of
"colony" previously provided, will also explore the political, economic and cul-
tural manifestations that result from-and provide evidence of-the colonial re-
lationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.
The strong undercurrents of racial bias that permeated U.S. society at the
turn of the century undoubtedly influenced the establishment of this colonial re-
lationship and its approval by the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases.4 The con-
tinued enforcement of this flawed relationship is not only outdated, but is also
1. A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 102 (Julius Gould & William Kolb eds., 1964)
(source sanctioned by UNESCO).
2. Cf Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by As-
sociated Statehood: Puerto Rico's Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123
(2009) (critiquing the legality of Puerto Rico's status under both international and
domestic law).
3. See Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901) (holding that a vessel engaged
in trade between Puerto Rico and New York is engaged in coastal trade and not
foreign trade); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico did
not become a part of the United States within the meaning of Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) (invalidating tar-
iffs imposed on goods exported from the United States to Puerto Rico after ratifi-
cation of the treaty between the United States and Spain); Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 222 (1901) (holding that the right of the President to exact duties on imports
into the United States from Puerto Rico ceased after the ratification of the peace
treaty between the United States and Spain); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901) (holding that Puerto Rico and Hawaii were not foreign countries within the
meaning of United States tariff laws); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (holding
that, once Puerto Rico was acquired by the United States through cession from
Spain, it was not a "foreign country" within the meaning of tariff laws).
4. See RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL




clearly contrary to a proper interpretation of the Constitution and the Law of the
Land' as expressed in the United States' treaty commitments.' The cases that al-
low this anachronistic system of governance to stand-particularly when applied
against a community of 3.9 million U.S. citizens endowed with citizenship for
nearly a century-should be soundly rejected by the same institution whose de-
cisions have allowed this regime to exist for one hundred and twelve years.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF THE INSULAR CASES
A result of the Spanish-American War of 1898 was that the United States ac-
quired sovereignty from Spain over Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, and
Guam.' Pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty of Paris ending this war, "[t]he civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories . .. ceded to
the United States shall be determined by Congress." The interpretation of this
provision and its diverse applications to the inhabitants of these territories has
been the source of much controversy and litigation, including the Insular Cases.
As will be discussed in further detail, this Article takes as a basic tenet that no
treaty can trump the Constitution.
advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What kind of relationship would
the new peoples have with the body politic? Was it to be the relationship of the
Reconstruction period, an attempt at political equality for dissimilar races, or was
it to be the Southern 'counterrevolutionary' point of view which denied the basic
American constitutional rights to people of color? The actions of the federal gov-
ernment during the imperial period and the relegation of the Negro to a status of
second-class citizenship indicated that the Southern point of view would prevail.
The racism which caused the relegation of the Negro to a status of inferiority was
to be applied to the overseas possessions of the United States.").
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (" {A] l Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .. .").
6. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States June 8,1992) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Amer-
ican Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948),
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1 (1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111) (Dec. iO, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
7. Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368 § 2, 39 Stat. 948, 951-52 (1917) (granting U.S. citizen-
ship to the residents of Puerto Rico). Since the Jones Act, all persons born in Puerto
Rico automatically become U.S. citizens.
8. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain,
U.S.-Spain, Dec. lo, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
On the subject of the Spanish-American War of 1898, see IVAN MUSICANT, EMPIRE
BY DEFAULT: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE DAWN OF THE AMERICAN
CENTURY (1998); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, GLOBAL INTRIGUES: THE ERA OF THE SPANISH-
AMERICAN WAR AND THE RISE OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORLD POWER (2007); and
DAVID F. TRASK, THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898 (1981).
9. Treaty of Paris, supra note 8, 30 Stat. at 1759.
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This "splendid little war," as the Spanish-American War was fondly referred
to by those who favored and promoted its execution,'o was the culmination of a
long process of national territorial expansion. This process was cloaked or justi-
fied in various ways," but was generally verbalized under the rubric of "manifest
destiny"-a term coined by newspaperman John Louis O'Sullivanl2 that became
the rallying cry for U.S. expansionists in the nineteenth century. It was an expres-
sion that encapsulated a mantra of Darwinian imperialism, 3 containing elements
io. These so-called "Large Policy" proponents included Theodore Roosevelt, then As-
sistant Secretary of the Navy and later the second in command of the "Rough Rid-
ers" of San Juan Hill fame; Brookes Adams, a Boston historian who was the grand-
son of John Quincy Adams; Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from
Massachusetts; and Admiral Alfred Mahan, whose theories on naval supremacy
were an important factor in influencing U.S. expansionist policies. See, e.g., A.T.
MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, at 72 (13th ed.
1957) ("Colonies... afford... the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power
of a country.").
After the war, which scarcely lasted four months, the U.S. ambassador to Great
Britain wrote to Theodore Roosevelt: "It has been a splendid little war; begun with
the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favoured
by that fortune which loves the brave." HUGH THOMAS, CUBA OR THE PURSUIT OF
FREEDOM 404 (1971) (quoting correspondence); see FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID
LITTLE WAR: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR (1958).
n1. See JULIUS PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898: THE ACQUISITION OF HAWAII AND THE
SPANISH ISLANDS (Peter Smith ed., 1959) (1936) (discussing the various motives,
techniques, and propaganda employed by politicians, journalists, religious leaders,
and the military to influence the expansion of imperialism in 1898, which ultimately
resulted in the United States' acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philip-
pines).
12. He coined this term in an Article in the Democratic Review, of which he was the
editor. Julius W. Pratt, John L. O'Sullivan and Manifest Destiny, 14 N.Y. HIST. 213-34
(1933). The term "manifest destiny" was originally used to describe the "expectation
that the U.S., thanks to the superior qualities of the Anglo-Saxons as such [includ-
ing, presumably, the Irish] and to their democratic institutions, would inevitably
absorb their neighbours." THOMAS, supra note 1o, at 2011-17. Although the idea
originally encompassed mainly expansion to the Pacific Ocean and was considered
a tactic for increasing the number of pro-slavery States, after the Civil War similar
themes were adopted by the Republican expansionists as a slogan for overseas con-
quests. See H.C. Lodge, Our Blundering Foreign Policy, FORUM, Mar. 1895, at 8, 8-17.
13. See John Fiske, Manifest Destiny, HARPER'S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 1885, at 578,
588 (" [T]he general conclusion that the work which the English race began when it
colonized North America is destined to go until every land on the earth's surface
that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall become English in its language,
in its religion, in its political habits and traditions, and to a predominant extent in
the blood of its people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race will
trace its pedigree to English forefathers, as four-fifths of the white people in the
United States trace their pedigree today. The race thus spread over both hemi-




of geopolitical theory, religious righteousness,' 4 and economic entrepreneurship
aimed at justifying territorial aggrandizement and the conquering, subjugation,
and absorption of 'inferior' people and races 'for their own good."
This bias for territorial expansion surfaced early in the United States' na-
tional life, even before the phrase "manifest destiny" emerged. 6 In fact, before
the United States was an independent nation, the inhabitants of the thirteen col-
onies were already vigorously engaged in informal territorial expansion west of
the Appalachian Mountains. At the close of the Revolutionary War, Great Britain
ceded these western territories to the new nation in the Treaty of Peace, which
officially ended the United States' own struggle for independence against Great
Britain's colonial yoke. 7
of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England
first stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachu-
setts.").
14. See JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY: ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS 175
(New York, Baker & Taylor, Co. 1885) ("[Tihis [Anglo-Saxon] race of unequaled
energy, with all the majesty of numbers and the might of wealth behind it-the
representative, let us hope, of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest
civilization-having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its
institutions upon mankind, will spread itself over the earth. If I read not amiss, this
powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South Amer-
ica, out upon the islands of the seas, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone
doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the 'survival of the fit-
test'?").
15. This was the thrust of British novelist and poet, Rudyard Kipling, who glorified
nineteenth-century imperialism in his poem The White Man's Burden: The United
States and the Philippine Islands. Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden,
MCCLURE'S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 290. The poem was published at the beginning of
the Filipinos' insurrection against the U.S. invasion (and contemporaneous with
the U.S. Senate's ratification of the Treaty of Paris confirming the acquisition of
those islands as well as Puerto Rico and Guam).
16. In 1801, Thomas Jefferson wrote James Monroe: "However our present interests
may restrain us within our limits, it is impossible not to look forward to distant
times, when our rapid multiplication will expand beyond those limits, and cover
the whole northern if not the southern continent." R.W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING
AMERICAN EMPIRE 87 (1960) (quoting correspondence).
17. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Brit-
tanic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. Pursuant to its provisions,
Great Britain ceded its claims to all lands west of the Appalachian Mountains as far
West as the Mississippi River, North to Canada and South to Spanish-Florida: the
so-called Old Northwest Territory. See TORRUELLA, supra note 8, at 28, 85. This ter-
ritory comprised 385,000 square miles and was larger than the original thirteen col-
onies. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established the process whereby these ter-
ritories would be admitted to the Union as states, thus paving the way for West
Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Michigan to achieve their constitutional status. 1 Stat. 50, 51 (1789).
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Thereafter, national expansion continued at a steady pace and in diverse
forms, with the United States' last major territorial acquisition prior to 1898 tak-
ing place after the Mexican War of 1848. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
which ended the war, forced Mexico to cede approximately five hundred thou-
sand square miles of its national territory to the United States, thus extending the
nation's borders from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and virtually establishing
the present boundaries of the continental homeland."
Nevertheless, throughout this period in U.S. history, the nation's fundamen-
tal goal in extending its borders was creating more States-not the acquisition of
colonies.'9 The Supreme Court clearly expressed the lack of constitutional au-
thority for the United States to rule as a colonial power in Scott v. Sanford, a case
which, although discredited for other reasons, was otherwise still valid constitu-
tional precedent when the Insular Cases were decided. The Court there stated:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor
to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by admission of new
States . . . . [No] power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and
governed [in a] permanently [colonial] character.2 0
Yet, in its treatment of the territories acquired after the Spanish-American War,
the United States has followed the colonial formula to this very day, a path au-
thorized by the Supreme Court's unwarranted reversal of established constitu-
tional and historical precedent in the Insular Cases.
There were, of course, factual differences between these newly conquered
Spanish lands and the territories annexed prior to 1898-differences which, as we
shall see, were used by the Supreme Court as an excuse for its differing constitu-
tional treatment of these new acquisitions. The new lands were non-contiguous
islands separated by thousands of miles of ocean from the U.S. continental main-
land. Perhaps more importantly, they were not, in contrast to the American West,
large areas of mostly uninhabited land masses, but were instead populated by
18. The Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mex-
ico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. Mexico ceded the lands that today comprise
the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada, as well as parts
of Colorado, Wyoming and Oklahoma, and the remnants of Texas not included in
the Republic of Texas, which was annexed in 1845. Thereafter, in 1853, by the so-
called Gadsden Purchase, the United States acquired land from Mexico that allowed
the present day configuration of our border with Mexico to be established.
TORRUELLA, supra note 8, at 29.
19. ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITz, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 6 (1989) ("The Northwest Ordinance not only set
forth the pattern of territorial development which exists even today but also stated
the underlying principle of territorial evolution in U.S. law and tradition: that the
goal of all territorial acquisition eventually was to be Statehood.").
20. Scott v. Sanford, 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393, 446 (1856).
62
32 : 57 2013
RULING AMERICA'S COLONIES
established communities" whose inhabitants differed from the dominant state-
side societal structure with respect to their race,' language," customs, cultures,
religions," and even legal systems.25
These differences contributed to the substantial opposition to expansion into
these new lands that was expressed by important sectors of the nation's public
while the Spanish-American War was in progress-opposition that only in-
creased when a serious insurrection broke out against the United States' occupa-
tion of the Philippines immediately following the cessation of hostilities with
21. Puerto Rico had a population of 953,243 in 1899. J.P. SANGER, U.S. WAR DEP'T,
REPORT ON THE CENSUS OF PORTO RICO, 1899, at 40 (19oo).The Philippine Islands
had a population of approximately 7.6 to 8 million inhabitants shortly after the
change in sovereignty took place in 1898. PHILIPPINES NAT'L STAT. OFF., SUMMARY
OF PRINCIPAL VITAL STATISTICS IN THE PHILIPPINES: 1903-2010, at 3 (2013), http://
census.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/crd/article/SUMMARY%2oOF%
2oPRINCIPAL%2oVITAL%2,TATISTICS; see S. REP. NO. 218, at 76 (1901). Guam's
population-which was mostly Chamorros, a Mayo-Polynesian race prevalent
throughout the Marianas Archipelago-was i,806 in 1910. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
GUAM: POPULATION AGRICULTURE 1 tbl.i (1941), http://pacificweb.org/DOCS/
guam/guam 1940%2oCensus.pdf (listing Guam's population from 1901 to 1940).
22. In 19oo, out of a total population of seventy-six million in the United States, 87.9%
were white, 11.6% were black, and 0.5% were of other races. FRANK HOBBS& NICOLE
STooMS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSR-4, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 77 figs.3.3 & 3.4 (2002). In 1899, the population of Puerto Rico was 62%
white, mostly of Hispanic ethnicity, with the balance of the population classified as
"black" pursuant to a census conducted by the U.S. military authorities. See Mara
Loveman and Jeronimo Muhiz, How Puerto Rico Became White: Boundary Dynam-
ics and Intercensus Racial Reclassification, 72 AM. Soc. REV. 915, 915 (2007).
23. In 1898, Spanish was the official language of Puerto Rico and the vernacular of all
of its native inhabitants. It was also the official language of the Philippines, with a
substantial number of native inhabitants speaking it to some degree in their ver-
nacular, particularly in the cities.
24. In 1906, when the U.S. Census Bureau began collecting religious data, of a total
population of 85 million in the United States, approximately one third, or about 32
million Americans, were affiliated with some church or religion. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RELIGIOUS BODIES: 1906, at 24 (1910).
While the United States was mainly a Protestant nation in 1900, the principal reli-
gion of Puerto Rico was Roman Catholicism, which was the state religion of the
Spanish Empire. The Catholic Church had a large presence in the Philippines,
claiming 5.8 million adherents, not only because it was the only religion allowed by
the government, but also because of the enormous tracts of land owned by the var-
ious religious orders. See S. REP. NO. 218, at 76 (1901). In the Phillippine hinterlands,
there were approximately 8oo,ooo natives who mostly practiced animistic religions.
Islam was the chosen religion of approximately 6oo,ooo Moros, mostly in the
southern Philippine islands of Mindanao, Jolo, Basilan, and Balabac. Id.
25. The legal system of the Spanish territories was civil law, based on the Napoleonic
Code. The United States, of course, was a common law country, with the exception
of Louisiana, which basically had the Napoleonic Code as its lexfori.
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Spain." This opposition, in turn, effectively converted the U.S. presidential elec-
tions of 19oo into a referendum regarding whether to permanently retain the
Spanish islands. 7 Thus, the reelection of McKinley, the Spanish-American War-
time President, with his new running mate Theodore Roosevelt, one of the lead-
ing advocates of that war and a fervent promoter of imperial expansion, effec-
tively settled the political question of whether the United States would retain con-
trol of these former Spanish colonies. The constitutional question of how to rule
these lands and their people-phrased in the prevalent lingo of the times as "does
the Constitution follow the flag"-was answered by a fractured Supreme Court
in 1901 in a series of decisions now known as the Insular Cases.2 9
The historical background summarized here-particularly the obvious belief
in racial superiority that supported the "manifest destiny" policies expressed by
the controlling political factions-is crucial to understanding how the Insular
Cases became the law of the land despite constitutional and historic precedents
that augured a different outcome.
26. See GREGG JONES, HONOR IN THE DUST: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, WAR IN THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA'S IMPERIAL DREAM (2012); BRIAN
MCALLISTER LINN, THE PHILIPPINE WAR: 1899-1902 (2000). The United States suf-
fered 4,165 combat losses in the Insurrection. In comparison, twenty thousand Fil-
ipino insurrectionists were killed by American troops and the civilian casualties are
estimated at between two hundred thousand and one and a half million. John Bel-
lamy Foster & Robert W. McChesney, Kipling, the 'White Man's Burden,' and U.S.
Imperialism, MONTHLY REV., Nov. 1 2003, http://monthlyreview
.0rg/2003/11/o1/kipling-the-white-mans-burden-and-u-s-imperialism.
27. See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Insular Cases, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Soo, 500 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005)
("[T]he acquisition of foreign territories[] received overwhelming popular en-
dorsement in the presidential election of 19oo."). But see Thomas A. Bailey, Was the
Presidential Election of 9oo a Mandate on Imperialism?, 24 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV.
43, 45-47 (1937) (arguing that it was William Jennings Bryan's support of the silver
standard that caused his defeat in the 1900 election, rather than McKinley's belief
in imperialism).
28. THE INSULAR CASES, COMPRISING THE RECORDS, BRIEFS, AND ARGUMENTS OF
COUNSEL INTHEINSULAR CASES OF THEOCTOBERTERM, 1900, IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING APPENDIXES THERETO 705 (Gov't Printing Of.,
1901) (repeating the Solicitor General's statement that "[tlhe difficulty of a clear
conception of the important question in these cases had been increased by the use
of campaign catchwords, of political phrases. 'The Constitution follows the flag' is
one of these"); see id. at 170, 312, 590, 634.
29. See supra note 3 (listing cases). A famous political humorist of the times quipped
through his main character, Mr. Dooley, after the Insular Cases were decided,
"[that] no matter whether th' Constitution follows th' flag or not, th' Supreme
Court follows th' iiction returns." FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS
26 (1901); see Walter LaFeber, The Election of 1goo, in 3 HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1900-1936, at 1879 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. et al. eds.,
1971).
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II. THE INSULAR CASES ARE DECIDED
The Spanish-American War guns were barely silenced when a national de-
bate ensued about these conquered lands. Although the issue of whether the
Spanish islands would be kept was resolved at the bargaining table in Paris, and
reaffirmed by the outcome of the 1900 election, a hot academic polemic soon
erupted. This debate emanated principally from the Harvard and Yale law
schools, and concerned how these former Spanish lands would be governed. This
debate took its most influential form in a series of law review Articles written by
prominent academics from 1898 through 1900 that would have paramount influ-
ence on the Supreme Court in its consideration and decision of the Insular
Cases.3o
The academic debate was followed by congressional action in 19oo in the
form of the Foraker Act,' which established a civil government in Puerto Rico
30. See, e.g., Elmer B. Adams, The Causes and Results of Our War with Spain from a
Legal Stand-Point, 8 YALE L.J. 119 (1898) (arguing that the acquisition of territories
is undemocratic, yet objecting to statehood for acquired territories); Simeon E.
Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government
by the United States oflsland Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 412 (1899) (arguing that
the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines was constitutional and stating
that Congress could establish governments therein once the treaty with Spain was
ratified, but also stating that there were several open questions including
"[w]hether Puerto Rico can be held permanently and avowedly as a colonial de-
pendence"); John Kimberly Beach, Constitutional Expansion, 8 YALE L.J. 225, 234
(1899) (evaluating the constitutionality of United States' occupation, acquisition,
and control of the Philippines, and concluding that acquisition is a "duty" of the
United States in the name of "restoration of order and security to life and property
in the Philippines"); C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARv. L.
REV. 365, 371 (1899) (discussing the definition and scope of the term "United States,"
and arguing that, while the term might encompass the Territories, the "use of the
word ... has . .. no legal or constitutional significance"); Abbott Lawrence Lowell,
The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155, 176 (1899)
(examining the legal status of territories acquired by conquest or cession, differen-
tiating between territory acquired with the intention of incorporating into the
United States and territory acquired without that purpose, and stating that consti-
tutional rights do not apply to territory acquired without that purpose); Carman F.
Randolph, Constitutional Aspects ofAnnexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291, 306-09 (1898)
(arguing that the Constitution applies to Filipinos, and that because upon annexa-
tion Filipinos owe allegiance to the United States, they ought to be considered citi-
zens of the United States).
31. Pub. L. No. 56-191 § 4, 31 Stat. 77, 81-82, 84 (1900). The Act provided for the Presi-
dent to appoint a governor, a supreme court, and the upper house of a bicameral
legislature whose lower house was to be elected by popular vote, whose laws could
be annulled by Congress. It also created the office of "resident commissioner," a
non-voting elected position to the House of Representatives in Congress. The Fo-
raker Act gave Puerto Ricans less rights than they had under Spanish rule at the
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and provided a taxing mechanism to fund its operations. This was to be effectu-
ated by the imposition of taxes and duties collected on goods imported from the
United States to Puerto Rico.32 These taxes and duties provided the immediate
grounds for the litigation that led to the Insular Cases and framed the constitu-
tional issue raised: whether the imposition of this non-uniform tax contradicted
the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, which required that "all Duties, Im-
posts and Excises .. .be uniform throughout the United States."" The answer to
that question, of course, depended on whether the Constitution applied in the
territories ex propio vigore (i.e., did the Constitution follow the flag?). Framed
differently: was Puerto Rico, after it was acquired from Spain, excluded from the
term "United States" simply because it was a territory rather than a State?
This question had already been resolved in the context of the District of Co-
lumbia in Loughborough v. Blake, an 1820 opinion authored by Chief Justice Mar-
shall.34 Congress had enacted a statute imposing a tax that was only applicable in
the District of Columbia, and the question arose whether this non-uniform tax
was in violation of the Constitution's Uniformity Clause. As previously indicated,
the answer depended on whether the District of Columbia, a territory, was in-
cluded within the term "United States" as used in the Constitution, and thus sub-
ject to its provisions. The answer given by Chief Justice Marshall was clear and
unequivocal:
Does [the] term [United States] designate the whole, or any particular
portion of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit of
but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is com-
posed of States and territories. The District of Columbia, or territory
west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than Maryland
or Pennsylvania [and thus the Constitution applied and the tax was un-
constitutional]."
time of the U.S. invasion. At that time, Puerto Ricans were full Spanish citizens, had
voting delegates in the Spanish parliament, and, pursuant to a new Charter of Au-
tonomy that had gone into effect shortly before the U.S. invasion, possessed a de-
gree of autonomy bordering on national sovereignty. See JAMES L. DIETZ,
EcoNOMic HISTORY OF PUERTO Rico: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT 87-88 (1986); JOSE TRIAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE
OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 12-14 (1997).
32. Foraker Act § 4 (establishing that taxes and duties collected in Puerto Rico would
be "placed at the disposal of the President to be used for the government and benefit
of Porto Rico").
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
34. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
35. Id. at 319.
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After Loughborough, the issue of Congress' power over the territories pursu-
ant to the Territorial Clause" came up again thirty-six years later in the context
of an act of Congress prohibiting slavery in the then-territory of Missouri. In Scott
v. Sanford, a slave, Dred Scott, who had traveled to Missouri with his owner, filed
a proceeding claiming that by his entrance into a free territory any right of "own-
ership" over his person as "property" was null.3 7
Notwithstanding the opprobrious outcome of this case, Chief Justice Taney's
ruling regarding the power of Congress to legislate under the Territorial Clause
and the purpose and scope of that provision deserves to be evaluated inde-
pendently. In ruling on this issue, Chief Justice Taney was no less clear or une-
quivocal than Chief Justice Marshall had been in Loughborough:
[P]laintiff has laid much stress upon that article in the Constitution
which confers on Congress the power 'to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong-
ing to the United States;' but, in the judgment of the court, that provi-
sion has no bearing on the present controversy, and ... was intended to
be confined, to the territory which at that time [of its independence from
Great Britain] belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States ... and
can have no influence upon territory afterwards acquired from a foreign
Government. It was a special provision for a known and particular ter-
ritory, and to meet a present emergency, and nothing more.3
This passage made clear that the Constitution does not grant Congress the power
to indefinitely administer territorial acquisitions under its "plenary powers," cre-
ating in effect a colonial regime. As we shall see, however, rather than filling a
temporary administrative "emergency" brought about by the unexpected acqui-
sition of overseas territories, the colonial mode of ruling the Spanish islands and
their inhabitants has become a permanent modus operandi.
It is with this jurisprudential background that we come to the Insular Cases.39
But before discussing them in detail, it is worthwhile to step back and consider
these cases generally, with a goal to making some observations of universal appli-
cation.
The first point to be made is that all of these cases raised constitutional ques-
tions only in the context of more basic controversies involving commercial op-
erations in the new territories. Although these fundamentally commercial dis-
putes created the cases and controversies necessary for judicial intervention to
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States . . .
37. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
38. Id. at 432. The territory referred to was the territory encompassed by the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 5o (1789), which ironically referenced the States that today
encompass the Midwestern United States.
39. See supra note 3 (listing cases).
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take place, 40 and although their outcome was of fundamental importance to the
future of the people that inhabited these lands, they were not the typical scenario
for the litigation of crucial civil rights issues. In fact, as decided, the cases focused
on taxation and tariff issues, remaining resoundingly silent as to the political and
cultural inequalities effectuated by their holdings, which are the matters of real
import to the U.S. citizens residing in these lands today.
Second, with the exception of Huus v. New York & Puerto Rico Steamship
Co.,4 ' initially these issues were decided by five-to-four pluralities. Thus, even at
the colonial regime's inception, the rules by which it was to be administered, in
effect to this very day, were very much in doubt. In fact, the dissenting opinions
were the most intellectually unified, coherent, and constitutionally sound, and
they gathered more votes than any individual plurality opinion. This is particu-
larly true of the dissents of Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Harlan in the key case
of Downes v. Bidwell.42
Third, and in my view most important, a definite tinge of racial bias is dis-
cernible in several of the plurality opinions. This is not a surprising circumstance
considering that the Justices that decided the Insular Cases were, almost to a man,
the same that decided the infamous "separate but equal" case of Plessy v. Ferguson
in 1896.41 The rules established in the Insular Cases were simply a more stringent
version of the Plessy doctrine: the newly conquered lands were to be treated not
only separately, but also unequally.
In the first of the Insular Cases, De Lima v. Bidwell,4 the Court struck down
a duty on goods imported from Puerto Rico into New York after the Treaty of
Paris. The Court held that after the ratification of the treaty with Spain, Puerto
Rico "became territory of the United States-although not an organized territory
in the technical sense of the word." 45 Thus, it was not foreign. Most surprising,
considering the cases that were to follow, is the following language from Justice
Brown's opinion:
The theory that a country remains foreign with respect to the tariff laws
until Congress has acted by embracing it within the Customs Union,
presupposes that a country may be domestic for one purpose and foreign
for another . . . . [N]o act is necessary to make it domestic territory if
once it has been ceded to the United States .... This theory also presup-
poses that territory may be held indefinitely by the United States; that it
may be treated in every particular, except for tariff purposes, as domestic
40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
41. Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). Huus was a unanimous decision.
42. 182 U.S. 244, 347 (1901) (Fuller, J., dissenting); id. at 375 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For a detailed account of the background of the Justices that sat
on the Insular Cases, see JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO
Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 41-43 (1985).
44. 182 U.S. 1 (1901).




territory; that laws may be enacted and enforced by officers of the United
States sent there for that purpose; .. . that everything may be done which
a government can do within its own boundaries, and yet the territory
may still remain a foreign country. That this state of things may continue
for years, for a century even, but that until Congress enacts otherwise, it
still remains a foreign country. To hold that this can be done a matter of
law we deem to be pure judicial legislation. We find no warrant for it in the
Constitution or in the powers conferred upon this court.46
Yet we will see that "pure judicial legislation," which ran contrary to longstanding
constitutional jurisprudence and historical precedents, is exactly what would re-
sult from the Insular Cases.
In fact, it was the dissenting view of Justice McKenna in De Lima that ex-
pressed judicially for the first time the novel perspective of Professor Lowell in
The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View,47 which eventually became the
prevailing rule of the Insular Cases. McKenna opined that Puerto Rico was not
incorporated into the United States because "the treaty with Spain, instead of
providing for incorporating the ceded territory into the United States, as did the
treaty with Mexico, expressly declare[d] that the status of the ceded territory
[was] to be determined by Congress"'-something that had not yet been done
by Congress as to Puerto Rico. By this inaction, McKenna stated, "the danger of
the nationalization of savage tribes cannot arise."49
Similarly, issues involving the application of the tariff laws to goods imported
to and from Puerto Rico (and Hawaii) 0 were critical in Goetze v. United States,"1
Dooley v. United States,52 and Armstrong v. United States.53
We thus come to Downes v. Bidwell,54 which challenged the validity of the
Foraker Act as violating the Uniformity Clause. This is the crucial Insular Case
because its decision squarely required determining whether the Constitution ap-
plied to Puerto Rico, which in turn became the deciding criteria as to how and
by whom the rules of governance applying to the exercise of U.S. sovereignty in
46. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
47. See Lowell, supra note 30.
48. De Lima, 182 U.S. at 214 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 219.
50. Hawaii was annexed by the United States at about this same time. See Newlands
Resolution, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
51. 182 U.S. 221 (1901), joined procedurally with Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901) (involving the same issues regarding Hawaii).
52. 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
53. 182 U.S. 243 (1901).
54. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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the territory would be established. Downes would eventually prove to be the cen-
tral case in establishing Puerto Rico's place within the United States polity to the
present day.
The various opinions that emanated from the Court in Downes reflect the
kaleidoscope of views that existed regarding the status of the new territories, par-
ticularly those influenced by the Yale and Harvard academics. A plurality of five
votes-with separate opinions from Justices Brown, Gray, and White-upheld
the validity of the Foraker Act for diverse and varied reasons. In a lead opinion
guaranteed to give nightmares to present day originalists,55 Justice Brown stated
that the issues presented were broader than whether the revenue clauses of the
Constitution extended ex propio vigore to Puerto Rico. He concluded that these
questions were answered not only in the Constitution itself, but also by looking
to "the nature of the government created by that instrument, in the opinion of
its contemporaries, in the practical construction put upon it by Congress, and in
the decisions of this court."" He included everything but the kitchen sink! Con-
veniently, he also did not follow the last part of his own directive, discarding as
dicta the holdings of both Scott and Loughborough (which had decided the exact
same issue as Downes while the ink of the signers was still wet on the Constitu-
tion)."
The comments of Charles E. Littlefield in the Harvard Law Review regarding
Justice Brown's sidestepping of Loughborough are worth reproducing:
Mr. Justice Brown says there are "certain observations [in Loughbor-
ough] which have occasioned some embarrassment in other cases," but
I submit in none so great as the Downes case. The extraordinary ingenu-
ity manifested in this case by the earnest effort to escape from that au-
thority constitutes one of its most striking features . . . . Mr. Justice
Brown is entitled to the credit of introducing in an opinion for the first
time a new method of disposing of that case. I do not say he discovered
it, for it is true that there were statesmen who, in groping about for a way
to escape from Marshall's logic, had blazed out this path. [Justice
Brown] admits that the conclusion [in Loughborough] is correct, "so far
at least as it applies to the District of Columbia." He cannot quite get up
to denying the case in toto."
55. The present day originalists argue that the interpretation of the Constitution should
be based on the original meaning of the words of the Constitution. See Steven G.
Calabresi, Introduction, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF DEBATE 1, 14-15
(Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); cf Edwin Meese III, The Case for "Originalism,"
HERITAGE FOUND. (June 6, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary
/2005/o6/the-case-for-originalism (arguing that "judges should issue rulings based
on the original understanding of the authors and ratifiers of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights") (emphasis added).
56. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 249.
57. Id. at 292-93.




Nevertheless it is Justice Brown's racially riddled perspective, rather than his legal
maneuvering, that is most offensive. Brown wrote:
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant posses-
sions grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and
customs of the people, and from differences of soil, climate and produc-
tion, which may require action on the part of Congress that would be
quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited
only by people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of native Indi-
ans. 9
A false step at this time might be fatal to the development of what Chief
Justice Marshall called the American Empire .... If those possessions
are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws,
methods of taxation, and modes of thought, the administration of gov-
ernment and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a
time be impossible; and the question at once arises whether large con-
cessions ought not be made for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories
may be carried out, and the blessings of a free government under the
Constitution extended to them. We decline to hold that there is anything
in the Constitution to forbid such action.60
In a concurrence that again echoed Professor Lowell's law review Article, Jus-
tice White built upon this lead opinion, offering a view of incorporation that
stands as the ultimate rule of the Insular Cases to this day. Justice White held that
Puerto Rico's status was derived from the United States' treaty with Spain and
would therefore remain unchanged until Congress chose to act:
[W] here a treaty contains no conditions for incorporation, and, above
all, where it not only has no such conditions but expressly provides to
the contrary, incorporation does not arise until in the wisdom of Con-
gress it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached that state where
it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of the American
family."'
Perhaps most puzzling is Justice White's conclusion regarding Puerto Rico's ter-
ritorial status, which is both cryptic and indecipherable. Near the end of his
lengthy opinion, he proclaimed that, while "not a foreign country," Puerto Rico
"was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense."6 This conclusion estab-
59. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282.
60. Id. at 286-87.
61. Id. at 339 (White, J., concurring). Gray's short concurrence largely reiterated the
idea that incorporation occurred only at Congress' behest, with specific focus on
the nature of the United States' treaty- and war-making powers. Id. at 344-47 (Gray,
J., concurring).
62. Id. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring).
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lishes the untenable-and, in my opinion, unconstitutional-concept of a terri-
tory that is both foreign and domestic at once.3 At a minimum, this confusing
language, whatever its intended meaning, was in clear conflict with De Lima,64
which held that Puerto Rico was domestic territory and within the U.S. tariff bar-
rier. Justice White's opinion left this conflict unexplained, as it remains today.
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent-joined by Justices Harlan, Brewer, and
Peckam-picked up the gauntlet and answered Justices Brown and White in full:
[T]he contention seems to be that if an organized and settled province
of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the
power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of
ambiguous existence for an indefinite period, and more than that, that
after it has been called from that limbo, commerce with it is absolutely
subject to the will of Congress, irrespective of constitutional provisions.
Great stress is thrown upon the word "incorporation," as if pos-
sessed of some occult meaning, but I take it that the act under consider-
ation made Porto Rico, whatever its situation before, an organized ter-
ritory of the United States.
That theory assumes that the Constitution created a government
empowered to acquire countries throughout the world, to be governed
by different rules than those obtaining in the original States and territo-
ries, and substitutes for the present system of republican government, a
system of domination over distant provinces in the exercise of unre-
stricted power."
Chief Justice Fuller considered that such unrestricted power was negated by the
Constitution in language "too plain and unambiguous to permit its meaning to
be thus influenced."6 6
Justice Harlan, at his best in dissent, focused on what he deemed to be the
fundamental flaw of the Insular Cases: their failure to honor and give due weight
to the fact that the Constitution "speaks . . . to all peoples, whether of States or
territories, who are subject to the authority of the United States." 67 This is in con-
trast to the dogma of the Insular Cases, by which the constitutional rights of citi-
zens are determined by the land on which they stand, rather than their status as
63. See FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
64. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
65. Downes, 182 U.S. at 372-73. (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 374.
67. Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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citizens." Justice Harlan further chastised the plurality for promoting what in his
view was "a radical and mischievous change in our system of government."' This
charge is clearly justified; until the Insular Cases were decided-or more accu-
rately, until the theory and terminology on which the cases rest was concocted in
the halls of Harvard and Yale law schools-there had been no such distinction as
to "incorporated" versus "unincorporated" territories. Justice Harlan, in what
would be prescient words as regards Puerto Rico, argued that Congress cannot
deal with new territories just as other nations have done or may do with
new territories . . . . Monarchical and despotic governments, unre-
strained by written constitutions, may do with newly acquired territories
what this Government may not do consistently with our fundamental
law. To say otherwise is to concede that Congress may, by action taken
outside the Constitution, engraft upon our republican institutions a co-
lonial system such as exists under monarchical governments. Surely such
a result was never contemplated by the fathers of the Constitution ....
The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the
earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or prov-
inces-the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as Congress
chooses to accord them-is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and ge-
nius as well as the words of the Constitution. 70
Unfortunately for the inhabitants of the conquered Spanish islands, despite
these well-reasoned dissents, the holding in Downes laid the grounds for recog-
nition of omnipotent plenary powers in Congress-derived from a treaty rather
than the Constitution-that to this day have allowed the United States to rule
over the islands without their consent or their democratic participation. In this
way, the Insular Cases effectively turned on its head the clear and unquestionable
basis of U.S. law: legal authority must be derived from the Constitution, and that,
when laws or treaties conflict with that supreme document, they cannot stand.71
The last of the Insular Cases was Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship
Co.7 1 In this case, the Court unanimously ruled that a vessel entering the port of
New York from Puerto Rico did not have to pay pilotage fees because it was not
engaged in foreign trade.73 Thus ended the first round of constitutional litigation
regarding the colonial administration by the United States of its territories.
68. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922) ("It is locality that is determinative
of the application of the Constitution ... not the [citizenship] status of the people
who live in it.").
69. Downes, 182 U.S. at 379.
70. Id. at 380.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . ").
72. 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
73. Id. at 397.
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III. LIFE AFTER THE INSULAR CASES
A. Colonialism 1o
Several general rules emerged from the Insular Cases and their progeny: (I)
the de jure conclusion that Article IX of the Treaty of Paris trumped the Consti-
tution in determining the civil rights of the inhabitants of the former Spanish
islands and the status of these territories; (2) the identification of the Territorial
Clause as the source of Congress' plenary powers over Puerto Rico; (3) the con-
clusion that the Constitution did not fully apply to Puerto Rico ex propio vigore
because Congress had not "incorporated" Puerto Rico into the United States; (4)
the conclusion that only those rights deemed to be "fundamental" applied in un-
incorporated territories, a determination the Court would make on a case-by-
case basis; and (5) the distinction that all the territories acquired by the United
States prior to the Spanish-American War would be deemed to be "incorporated"
territories to which the Constitution fully applied.
The folly of these rules can be plainly seen when considered in light of the
undeniable principle that it is the Constitution-not Congress-that determines
the civil rights of those subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This is a
proposition cogently expressed by the Court in its recent Boumediene v. Bush
opinion: "The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to ac-
quire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where
its terms apply."74
B. The Grinding Stone Keeps Grinding
Life and death moved on, and as the composition of the Court slowly
changed, the "incorporation" proponents continued to gain votes.75 Meanwhile,
two cases of prime importance to Puerto Rico were decided: Hawaii v. Mankichiy6
and Rassmussen v. United States.7 Both cases are similar in issues and results.
The issue in Mankichi was whether Hawaii was an incorporated territory, in
which case the Constitution would have required that, in a criminal case, a de-
fendant be indicted by a grand jury and convicted by the unanimous verdict of a
petit jury. The Court ruled that Hawaii was not incorporated until after 19oo,
74. 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008).
75. See TORRUELLA, supra note 43, at 62-84. Before nominating Oliver Wendell Holmes
to the Court in 1902, President Roosevelt sought assurances that Holmes supported
the Insular Cases' outcome; Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge responded
that he would not have supported Holmes' nomination "unless he held the position
[] describe[d]." G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND
THE INNER SELF 234-37 (1993) (quoting correspondence).
76. 190 U.S. 197 (1903).




when citizenship was granted to its residents/7 and therefore rejected Mankichi's
claims because he had been indicted and tried before that date. The grant of citi-
zenship to the residents of a territory was thus held to be indicative of the incor-
poration of that territory. This ruling was then reinforced by Rassmussen, which
involved a misdemeanor conviction in Alaska by a six-person jury. A majority of
the Justices in Rassmussen joined Justice White's opinion, in which he concluded
that Alaska had been incorporated into the United States because the treaty of
cession with Russia specifically declared that "[t]he inhabitants of the ceded ter-
ritory ... shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and
immunities of citizens of the United States." 9 In other words, through the grant
of citizenship Alaska's inhabitants had acquired the full protection of the Consti-
tution. It was thus generally assumed, particularly in Puerto Rico, that if U.S.
citizenship were granted to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, incorporation into the
United States would follow automatically and the full rights granted under the
Constitution would come into force.
C. The Jones Act of 1917, U.S. Citizenship, and President Taft
Between 1901 and 1917, a total of twenty-one bills proposing to grant citizen-
ship to the residents of Puerto Rico were presented in Congress, culminating in
the Jones Act of 1917.8" Although these proposals received fairly strong support
from most of that period's presidential administrations, it is worth noting that
the administration of President William Howard Taft endorsed the citizenship
proposal only with the caveat that it be "entirely disassociated from any thought
of statehood."" Because Taft played such a crucial role in the destiny of Puerto
Rico, it is necessary to pause and discuss his background at some length.
Taft had an extensive background in insular and colonial affairs. In January
1900, when the Philippine insurgency was at its height, he resigned as Chief Judge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in order to be sent by President
McKinley to serve as the first civilian governor of that territory, a post he occu-
pied until 1904. By that time, the insurgency had been vigorously crushed and
Taft returned to become the Secretary of War for then-President Theodore Roo-
sevelt, who had succeeded McKinley after his assassination and with whom Taft
obviously shared expansionist views. While in Washington, Taft nevertheless
continued to maintain an interest in the Philippines as well as in the Panama
78. Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 210-11; see Newlands Resolution, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat.
750 (1898). For a history of the United States' annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii,
see JULIA FLYNN SILER, LOST KINGDOM: HAWAII'S LAST QUEEN, THE SUGAR KINGS,
AND AMERICA'S FIRST IMPERIAL ADVENTURE (2012).
79. Rassmussen, 197 U.S. at 522.
80. For a detailed account of this process, see Jos6 Cabranes, Citizenship and the Amer-
ican Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391 (1978).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 62-341, at 2 (1912).
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Canal and Puerto Rico. In 1907, he was sent to Cuba to deal with unrest under
the provisions of the so-called Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution.
Taft was elected President of the United States in 1908, and it was during his
tenure, in 1909, that he had a major run-in with the Puerto Rican legislature-a
skirmish that is sometimes referred to as the "Puerto Rican Appropriation Crisis
of i9o9."'I This crisis began when the popularly elected lower house of the Puerto
Rican legislature refused to approve the annual budget for the insular govern-
ment in protest against various judicial designations made by the governor of
Puerto Rico-who, under the Foraker Act, was a presidential appointee. The re-
sulting impasse brought the insular government to a standstill, and Taft was
forced to negotiate-something he was not accustomed to doing with mere co-
lonials. Taft's pique with the situation led him to retaliate against Puerto Rico
with the Olmstead Act, by which he transferred administrative oversight over
Puerto Rico from the Department of the Interior to the War Department.4
Thereafter, in a message to Congress, Taft accused Puerto Rico's elected leaders
of irresponsibility and political immaturity, stating that Puerto Ricans had been
given too much power "for their own good.""*
Taft's own appointment as Chief Justice of the Court in 1921 would prove
unfortunate for the people of Puerto Rico, for it came just in time for him to
bring his prejudices to bear upon the crucial case of Balzac v. Porto Rico." This
82. The Platt Amendment was attached to the Army appropriations bill for 1901-1902.
Act of Mar. 2,1901, ch. 803, paras. I-VII, 31 Stat. 895, 898. The Cubans incorporated
the Amendment into the Cuban Constitution on June 12, 1901, as a condition im-
posed by the United States for the withdrawal of United States' troops from the
island. Among the provisions of the Amendment was the right of the United States
to intervene in Cuba's governance "for the preservation of Cuban independence,"
and the agreement to sell or lease to the United States land for naval or coaling
stations (e.g., Guantinamo). See CONSTITUCION DE CUBA art. III (1901).
83. Truman Clark, President Taft and the Puerto Rican Appropriation Crisis of 1909, 26
AMERICAS 152 (1969).
84. This represented a hardening of colonial policy. JORGE RODRIGUEZ BERUFF,
STRATEGY AS POLITICS, PUERTO RICO ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 37
(2007). Most of the "civilian" colonial governors of Puerto Rico from 1901 to 1950
were either former military or naval men or were intimately connected with the
War Department or the Navy. Id. at 17-28; see Clark, supra note 83 at 153 ("Taft's
strong reaction to the Puerto Rican Appropriations crisis and his subsequent ma-
nipulations of some of the Puerto Rican political leaders show another, perhaps
more Rooseveltian, side to him.").
85. William Howard Taft, President, Message to Congress (May lo, 1909), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 96 (David Burton ed., 2002). See
generally 2 HENRY PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (Ar-
chon Books 1964) (1939) (documenting Taft's political career and his statements
advocating less independence for Puerto Rico's government).




case required the Court to interpret the Jones Act of 1917, which had granted U.S.
citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico, in light of Mankichi and Rasmussen.
D. The Jones Act of 1917, U.S. Citizenship, and Chief Justice Taft
Given his background, it is difficult to overstate the influence that Taft was
able to exercise over the Court as Chief Justice. The coincidence of all the per-
sonal and official circumstances that coalesced in Chief Justice Taft would prove
unfortunate for the newly anointed U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico. The Court's
opinion in Balzac clearly bears the imprint of Taft's personal biases.
Jesus M. Balzac, the editor of a daily newspaper in Arecibo, Puerto Rico was
charged him with criminal libel-a misdemeanor under Puerto Rico's criminal
code-for having published a letter indirectly referencing the governor of Puerto
Rico. Relying on the Jones Act's grant of citizenship and the Mankichi and
Rassmussen cases, Balzac requested a jury trial." This request was denied. After
being convicted, Balzac appealed to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, which
affirmed the denial of his claim of entitlement to trial by jury as well as his con-
viction. Thereafter, he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. That
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, unanimously ruled that he was not
entitled to trial by jury.
In Taft's view, at least as to Puerto Rico, a grant of citizenship was a devalued
item as far as constitutional rights were concerned:
What additional rights did it give them? It enabled them to move into
the continental United States and becoming residents of any State there
to enjoy every right of any other citizen of the United States, civil, social
and political .... In Porto Rico, however, the Porto Rican can not insist
upon the right of trial by jury .... The citizen of the United States living
in Porto Rico can not there enjoy a right of trial by jury under the Federal
Constitution . . . . It is locality that is determinative of the application of
the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status
of the people who live in it."
Taft then proceeded to skirt Rassmussen, which, as will be recalled, was also a
misdemeanor conviction involving the right to trial by jury:
Alaska was a very different case from that of Porto Rico. It was an enor-
mous territory, very sparsely settled and offering opportunity for immi-
gration and settlement by American citizens. It was on the American
Continent and within easy reach of the then United States. It involved
none of the difficulties which incorporation of the Philippines and Porto
Rico presents, and one of them is in the very matter of trial by jury.9
87. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 300, 304-05.
88. Id. at 308-og (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 309.
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Taft next added insult to injury, reciting stereotypical conclusions that were
wholly lacking in any factual basis and barely disguised his biases and prejudices:
The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the responsibil-
ities of jurors. In common-law countries centuries of tradition have pre-
pared a conception of the impartial attitude jurors must assume. The
jury system postulates a conscious duty of participation in the machin-
ery of justice which it is hard for people not brought up in fundamentally
popular government at once to acquire ... . Congress has thought that
a people like the Filipino or the Porto Ricans, trained to a complete ju-
dicial system which knows no juries, living in compact and ancient com-
munities, with definitely formed customs and political conceptions,
should be permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt
this institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when .... We can not find
any intention to depart from this policy in making Porto Ricans Ameri-
can citizens, explained as this is by the desire to put them as individuals
on exact equality with citizens from the American homeland, to secure
them more certain protection against the world, and to give them an
opportunity, should they desire, to move into the United States proper
and there without naturalization to enjoy all political and other rights.90
Taft finished by stating that Puerto Rican residents were protected as to "funda-
mental [constitutional] rights," which he did not define, and left to future litiga-
tion. What is certain is that trial by jury was not a fundamental right in the eyes
of the Balzac Court,9' and thus Balzac's conviction stood. Even worse is the fact
that Balzac is still 'good' law and is frequently cited by the Court.92
It is hard to explain why this is so, for the Balzac opinion is riddled with
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and plain misinformation. To start, the idea that
trial by jury is not a fundamental right is simply not the law, at least where Main-
land citizens are involved.93 The idea that the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens
against their government vary depending on what U.S. jurisdiction those citizens
are standing in is not only absurd on its face, but has also been rejected by the
Supreme Court in cases where the extraterritorial extension of rights concerns
citizens that reside in States rather than territories.9 4 Additionally, in seeking to
avoid the applicability of Rassmussen to Balzac, it is difficult to fathom what rel-
90. Id. at 310-11.
91. Id. at 309-14.
92. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757-59 (20o8); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 406-07 (1991); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990).
93. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,149 (1968) ("Trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice. . . .").
94. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 487 (1957) (holding that the military trial of a U.S. ci-
vilian by U.S. authorities in England without the benefit of indictment by a grand




evance a number of factors-Alaska's sparse population, the existence of settle-
ment opportunities for the United States' citizens, or the distance of Alaska to the
United States proper as compared to Puerto Rico-had to the issue of whether
the right to trial by jury should exist in Puerto Rico as it did in Alaska and Hawaii.
The obvious predisposition of Taft to conclude that Puerto Ricans were in-
capable of or unable to comprehend an institution "of Anglo-Saxon origin" like
the jury is particularly vexing and lacking in any factual support. Had Taft not
been so intent upon reaching a result preordained by his prejudices, he would
have been aware of the fact that criminal jury trials had been conducted in the
U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico for twenty-three years, since 1899. And crim-
inal jury trials had been conducted in the local Puerto Rican courts in felony cases
for twenty-one years, since 1901, pursuant to Puerto Rico's own code of criminal
procedure.95 Furthermore, Puerto Ricans experienced at least some forms of pop-
ular government before the U.S. invasion, which, despite the promise of bringing
democracy to Puerto Rico,96 eliminated even those limited rights that Puerto Ri-
cans had at the time of the change in sovereignty. These lost rights included full
Spanish citizenship with equality of rights and representation in the Spanish Par-
liament to the tune of three senators and sixteen deputies 9 -fundamental dem-
ocratic rights that have yet to be achieved after one hundred and sixteen years of
United States' tutelage.
E. Local Self-Government v. Colonial Status
In time, the United States recognized that it needed to counteract a growing
Puerto Rican separatist movement that had become more prevalent and radical
in the late 1940s' and to present viable answers to increased international pres-
sures questioning the obviously colonial relationship that existed between United
95. The latter was something of which Taft was fully aware. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 300
("The code of criminal procedure of Porto Rico grants a jury trial in cases of felony
but not misdemeanors.").
96. When General Nelson A. Miles, of Indian Wars fame, landed in Guinica, Puerto
Rico on July 25, 1898, he proclaimed: " [W]e have not come to make war upon the
people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to
bring you protection, not only to yourselves but to ... bestow upon you the im-
munities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our Government." NELSON A.
MILES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY TO THE
SECRETARY OF WAR 31-32 (1898). On July 29, the mayor of Puerto Rico's second city,
Ponce, greeted the invading forces with the municipal band playing the "Star Span-
gled Banner," and shortly thereafter General Miles was forced to cable the War De-
partment: "Please send any national colors that can be spared, to be given to differ-
ent municipalities." See TORRUELLA, supra note 43, at 22.
97. See FERNANDO BAYRON TORO, HISTORIA DE LAS ELECCIONES Y PARTIDOS POLITICOS
DE PUERTO RICO 3, 25 (1977).
98. ROBERT WILLIAM ANDERSON, PARTY POLITICS IN PUERTO RIco 95-1o8 (1965).
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States and Puerto Rico.99 Thus, the local political establishment-under the
watchful eye of Washington-was eventually allowed to carry out a controlled
action to set up such local institutions as would allow an argument to be made
that a process of self-determination, approved by the Puerto Rican electorate, had
effectively ended the colonial relationship.
As part of this package, Congress approved legislation allowing the Puerto
Rican electorate to choose its own governor for the first time in history; 0 the
1950 election resulted in Luis Mufioz Marin being elected to that position. There-
after, Congress held hearings that resulted in legislation authorizing the people
of Puerto Rico to draft a constitution and hold a referendum to approve or dis-
approve the same.' Today, this legislation is commonly referred to by its statute
number: "Law 6oo." A constitutional convention produced such a document,
which was then approved by the Puerto Rican electorate. After the President and
Congress imposed several amendments on the Puerto Rican draft, the constitu-
tion was resubmitted to the Puerto Rican electorate, where it received its final
approval. Thus, on July 25, 1952, the so-called "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico"
was born.'o2
Although the constitutional status of Puerto Rico after this exercise was hotly
debated, constitutionally speaking, no change was effectuated in its basic colonial
relationship with the United States. As cogently summarized by one noted con-
stitutional scholar: "Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional
theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress continues to
possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico."0 3 In other words,
99. ROBERT ALDRICH & JOHN CONNELL, THE LAST COLONIES 156-57 (1998).
ioo. See Puerto Rico Elective Governor Act, Pub. L. No. 362 CH. 490, 61 Stat. 770 (1947).
ioi. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731(b)
(2006)) (allowing Puerto Ricans to draft their own constitution, subject to congres-
sional approval).
102. The official Spanish title of the Government of Puerto Rico is "Estado Libre Aso-
ciado," an enigmatic label if ever there was one, which literally translated means
"Free Associated State." As we have seen, Puerto Rico is neither free, nor is it asso-
ciated (it is, in fact, a U.S. colony), and it is most certainly not a State. The English
title "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" is equally problematic. It is not a "common-
wealth" as the term is used with regards to Massachusetts or Virginia or Pennsylva-
nia. Nor is it, of course, part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Both the
English and Spanish titles are a convenient terminology designed to hide its real
constitutional and political status from those who may be unawares of the back-
ground that led to Chief Justice Fuller to aptly describe it as a "disembodied shade."
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 372 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
103. David M. Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 6oo and the
Constitution ofthe Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico, 21 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 255, 307 (1952).
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while Law 6oo vested the Puerto Rican people with a measure of direct govern-
ance at the municipal and territorial level, it left wholly unaltered Congress's "su-
preme legislative [and administrative] power" over Puerto Rico.10 4
Thereafter, in what can at best be described as a marriage of convenience-
and, at worst, a monumental hoax' 0 -the Puerto Rican and United States' gov-
ernments appeared before the United Nations and were able to garner sufficient
votes to the effect that Puerto Rico had become a fully self-governing territory,
and that annual reports by the United States would therefore no longer be re-
quired regarding progress made toward self-determination.06
Perhaps the best evidence that no constitutional change really took place as
a result of the Law 600 exercise is the intellectual mea culpa of Jos6 Trias Monge,
the principal architect of this new, alleged, Commonwealth status."o7 Trias Monge
was a key player throughout the Law 600 scenario, including as a member of the
U.S. delegation that convinced the United Nations to change Puerto Rico's status
from that of a colonial entity."o' His confession that these steps effected no real
change was the central subject of his book, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest
Colony in the World.o9 It was an act of admirable intellectual courage, which re-
quired reversing the position that he had publicly espoused for close to fifty years:
that the colonial status of Puerto Rico had changed with the passage of Law 6oo.
The truth of this admission is borne out daily in Puerto Rico, where almost four
million United States citizens remain bound by congressional mandates passed
absent any direct voting representation.
IV. WHY THE UNITED STATES-PUERTO Rico RELATIONSHIP IS COLONIAL
This Article began by defining a colony as "a territory, subordinate in various
ways-political, cultural, or economic-to a more developed country. Supreme
legislative power and much of the administration rest[s] with the controlling
country, which [is] usually of a different ethnic group from the colony.""o
Clearly, the United States has a colonial relationship to Puerto Rico.
104. See supra note i and accompanying text (defining a colonial relationship).
105. See Juan R. Torruella, Hacia Donde Vas Puerto Rico?, 107 YALE L.J. 1503, 1514-17
(1998).
106. G.A. Res. (VIII) 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/2639, at 25-
26 (NOV. 27, 1953).
107. At the time that Law 6oo was enacted, Trias Monge was Puerto Rico's Attorney
General and later the Chief Justice of Puerto Rico's Supreme Court.
1o8. See G.A. Res. (VIII) 748, supra note 106; TORRUELLA, supra note 43, at 16o-66.
og. See TRIAS MONGE, supra note 31.
no. See supra note i and accompanying text.
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A. The Political Manifestations of Puerto Rico's Colonial Relationship
What we have in this relationship is not the subordination of Puerto Rico's
political power to that of the United States, but rather the lack of any political
power by Puerto Rico vis-t-vis the United States. The United States citizens re-
siding in Puerto Rico do not have the right to vote for national offices.' Even
more importantly, they lack any voting representation in Congress,"' the body
that has plenary power over Puerto Rico and its citizens, and whose enactments
permeate every facet of Puerto Rican society. Supreme legislative power therefore
lies solely in an institution that enacts laws without any effective participation or
consent from the U.S. citizens who are obligated to comply with them.
Further, this absolute vacuum or deficit of democratic entitlement carries
over to the administration of these congressionally imposed laws. Since the Ex-
ecutive Branch of government is led by a President and Vice President for whom
the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico cannot vote, they are deprived of any influence
as to how or by whom these laws will be administered.
Put simply, what exists is government without consent of the governed. The
Puerto Rican people are dictated to by a distant metropolitan power. Politically,
this is a classic colonial relationship.
B. The Economic Manifestations of Puerto Rico's Colonial Relationship
Another hallmark of a colonial relationship is the economic subjugation of
colonial territories, in which the governing nation exploits the natural resources
and labor force of its possession."3 The United States' treatment of Puerto Rico
bears the fundamental markers of just such economic subjugation in obvious
ways, including: the historical imposition of strict agricultural quotas, the mod-
ern-day economic dependencies created by unbalanced imports and exports, and
the long-unfettered appropriation of both the island's land and the life of its cit-
izens for strategic military use.
Between 19o and the 1950s, Puerto Rico's economy was based almost entirely
on sugar cane"4 and the production of molasses for refinement in stateside fac-
tories, as required by the production quotas imposed by the various Sugar Acts."5
Stateside absentee companies controlled 59% of the arable land, which resulted
inl. See Igartda-De la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)
("[T]he right [to vote for President] cannot be implemented by courts unless
Puerto Rico becomes a state or until the Constitution is changed . . . .").
112. See Igartia v. United States, 626 F-3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that U.S. citizens
residing in Puerto Rico do not have the right to elect Representatives to Congress).
113. See supra note I and accompanying text.
114. See TORRUELLA, supra note 43, at 234 tbl.21.
115. Sugar Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-388, 61 Stat. 922 (1947); Sugar Act of 1937, Pub. L.




in operations so profitable for the stockholders that at times dividends as high as
115% of their investments were declared."' In fact, between 1923 and 1930, the re-
turn on capital of the four largest U.S. sugar corporations averaged 22.5%, and
from 1920 to 1935 three of the U.S. sugar growers (Central Aguirre, South Porto
Rico, and Fajardo Sugar) distributed more than $60 million in dividends to their
shareholders while accumulating only $20 million for reinvestment (i.e., 75% of
the companies' earnings left Puerto Rico, as is classic in a colonial economy)."7
Meanwhile, the average daily wage for sugar cane cutters, received only during
the four to five months when the cane was harvested, was 63 cents in 1917 and
decreased to between 5o and 60 cents by 1932. During the rest of the year, these
workers were largely unemployed."'
In the 1940s the wages of the sugar workers also decreased as a result of union
activity and labor strife, much of which resulted in serious violent confronta-
tions.' 9 At the same time, the labor movement radicalized, seeking the aid of
Puerto Rico's nascent nationalist movement.2 o By the 1950s, increased costs of
production and competition from other sugar-producing areas led to the decline
of the sugar industry and formed the impetus for the Puerto Rican Government's
vigorous industrialization program, dubbed "Operation Bootstrap."m' -
Puerto Rico's industrial base diversified and grew exponentially for the next
forty years. Between 1960 and 1976, Puerto Rico went from sixth to first in Latin
America for total direct U.S. investment and accounted for 40% of all profits by
U.S. companies in Latin America, more than the combined earnings of all U.S.
subsidiaries in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.' Section 936 of the United States'
Internal Revenue Code provided significant tax incentives to U.S. corporations
operating out of Puerto Rico, and by 1977 several major multinationals reported
that more than one quarter of their worldwide profits were produced from their
Puerto Rico operations. 3 Chemical and pharmaceutical companies benefitted
most from the 936 tax shelter: Johnson & Johnson saved over $i billion in federal
taxes between 1980 and 1990; Smith-Kline, $987 million; Merck, $749 million; and
116. See TORRUELLA, supra note 3, at 235 n.858.
117. See DIETZ, supra note 31, at 139.
n8. Id. at III, 140-42.
119. JUAN GONZALEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN AMERICA 85 (2000).
120. See RONALD FERNANDEZ, THE DISENCHANTED ISLAND: PUERTO RICO AND THE
UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 116 (2d ed. 1996); see also DIETZ, supra
note 31, at 175.
121. DIETZ, supra note i, at 240-42.
122. See EMILIO PANTOJAs-GARCIA, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AS IDEOLOGY: PUERTO
RICO'S EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION EXPERIENCE 17-18 (1990).
123. I.R.C. § 936 (1996) (repealed 1996); see PANTOJAS-GARCIA, supra note 122, at 153.
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Bristol-Meyers, $627 million.'2 Other than the pharmaceutical and technical in-
dustries, however, most of these new section 936 factories-like the sugar indus-
try before them-depended on low labor costs. As wages increased through the
application of federal minimum wage laws, relocation to other more competitive
countries became economically sensible.
Over 40% of the companies that began conducting business with this local
tax exemption closed down Puerto Rican operations when Congress repealed
section 936 in 1996, further eroding the industrial base created by "Operation
Bootstrap." 125 The decision to repeal stemmed in large part from the frequent
abuse of this exemption by U.S. companies operating under its umbrella. This
was particularly true of firms with high research, development, and marketing
expenses but low production costs, who-by transferring their production, pa-
tents, and trademarks to wholly owned subsidiaries in Puerto Rico-shielded all
revenue produced by these products from federal income taxes."' The cost in lost
tax revenue to the federal government through use of this unintended loophole
grew to nearly $3 billion annually in 1987,27 as the section 936 companies turned
Puerto Rico into the U.S. capital's number one profit center in the world. In 1986,
for instance, U.S. investment in Puerto Rico surpassed even the nation's invest-
ments in Germany, Canada, Japan, and United Kingdom.1" These unintended
consequences had not been contemplated by Congress when it passed the section
936 legislation, and Congress therefore quickly moved to close this loophole.
As a result, Puerto Rico is today even more dependent on U.S. transfers to
maintain its weakened, marginal economy, receiving approximately $16 billion
annually in U.S. government subsidies and assistance.2 9 While Puerto Rican res-
idents do not pay federal income taxes on income derived from Puerto Rican
sources, they are fully taxed otherwise (despite, as previously discussed, having
124. See Kelly Richmond, Drug Companies Fear Loss of Tax Exemption, N.J. RECORD,
Nov. 8, 1993.
125. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 120, at 208. Section 936 served to incentivize Puerto Ri-
can business by providing favorable tax incentives to U.S. corporations operating
on the island. I.R.C. § 936 (1996) (repealed 1996). For discussion of the repeal's ef-
fect on Puerto Rico, see Milo W. Peck & Helene W. Johns, The Death of Section 936:
Closing a Loophole or Poor Policy?, 22 INT'L TAX J. 1, 8 (1996); and Angel L. Ruiz
Mercado & Edwin Mel6ndez, The Potential Impact of the Repeal of Section 936 on
Puerto Rico's Economy: Summary, BOLETIN DE ECONOMIA (Departamento de Eco-
nomia, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, P.R.) July-Sept. 1997, at 4-10.
126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-log, TAX POLICY: PUERTO RICO
AND SECTION 936 TAX CREDIT 3 (1993).
127. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-72BR, PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY TAX BENEFITS OF OPERATING IN PUERTO RICO 14 (1992).
128. See PANTOJAS-GARCIA, supra note 122, at 67.
129. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND OPERATING DATA
REPORT 18 (2013) ("Total United States federal transfer payments to individuals




no national political rights). 30 Additionally, 90% of Puerto Rico's exports are des-
tined for the mainland U.S. while, conversely, the island is a significant importer
of U.S. goods.'3 ' This makes Puerto Rico-which has contributed more wealth to
the United States than any other country in history-one of the largest (captive)
markets of U.S. goods, and means that, in effect, the federal subsidies to Puerto
Rico are "repatriated" through payment for these U.S. goods.
The Puerto Rican economy also continues to be almost totally controlled by
United States interests. Ownership of Puerto Rico's principal industries contin-
ues to be dominated by U.S.-based multinationals-mainly chemical, pharma-
ceutical, electronic, and scientific equipment manufacturers-whose net annual
profits derived from Puerto Rican activities surpassed $14 billion in 1995. In the
tourism industry, which is the second largest industry on the island, almost all
major hotels are owned or controlled by stateside capital. There are 178 Fortune
500 companies with Puerto Rico subsidiaries, and U.S. companies consistently
invest heavily in Puerto Rico, in part because the productivity rate of the work
force is one of the highest in the world.'32
130. In addition to the fact that Puerto Ricans pay federal taxes, the statistics cited in this
Section illustrate the extent to which much of Puerto Rico's economic instability
derives from the United States' historical misuse of its labor and land. Considering
that numerous military establishments that have occupied large areas of some of
Puerto Rico's best lands during the last sixty years, not to mention the multiple
sacrifices of the many U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico who have served and
fought in the Armed Forces, it is hard to argue that the federal subsidies received
by Puerto Rico are not wholly deserved. Perhaps a useful comparison is the foreign
aid which U.S. annually provides to countries throughout the world, many ofwhich
are only marginal allies. In 2011, the top five countries receiving economic and mil-
itary aid were, by amount: Afghanistan; $11.3 billion; Israel, $3 billion; Iraq, $2.5
billion; Pakistan, $2.1 billion; Egypt, $1.4 billion. USAID Foreign Assistance Fast
Facts: FY2on, US AID, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/fast-facts.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2013). Another five countries received more than $700 million in aid.
Id.
131. See GONZALEZ, supra note 119, at 249; Robert Z. Lawrence & Juan Lara, Trade Per-
formance and Industrial Policy, in THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO RICO: RESTORING
GROWTH 507, 528-31 (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006).
132. See CARIBBEAN Bus., THE PUERTO RICO INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT
RESOURCES 5 (2007) ("[Fifty-five] of [the] Fortune loo companies and 178 of [the]
Fortune 500 companies have operations in Puerto Rico."); id. at 20-21 (describing
the advantages of Puerto Rico's workforce); FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., REPORT ON
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PUERTO Rico's ECONOMY 4 (2012) ("In analyzing the
Puerto Rican economy, we keep in mind one of its unique features: a substantial
share of production is carried out by U.S. multinational corporations that took ad-
vantage of the sizable federal income tax benefits available to firms that located on
the Island. The repatriation of the profits of these corporations to their parent firms
on the U.S. mainland, in addition to a shifting of income by these U.S. corporations,
leads to an overstatement of the amount of income accruing to residents of Puerto
Rico."); see also To the Investor, GoV'T DEV. BANK P.R., http://www.gdb-pur.com/
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The high profit margins of these U.S.-based companies belie Puerto Rico's
resoundingly negative economic statistics. In large part, this is because nearly
four out of every ten dollars produced by Puerto Rican workers leaves the island,
ending up in the coffers of a U.S. firm.'33 In the mid-199os, for example, the av-
erage salary of Puerto Rican workers was only 21% of the average income of their
employers, as compared to 70% in the case of U.S. workers.134 Adding to this ex-
portation of profits derived from Puerto Rican labor is an unemployment rate
that is rarely below 10%-and at times over 16%13 -which results in nearly half
the Puerto Rican population living below the U.S. poverty level.'36 Perhaps a tell-
ing measure of the questionable beneficence of section 936 companies towards
Puerto Rico is the fact that in 1989, when pharmaceutical companies earned more
than $3 billion in profits from their Puerto Rico operations, they gave a total of
only $1 million in charitable donations.37
If the above facts are not enough to demonstrate a colonial relationship, the
Jones Acts' requires that all cargo shipped to and from the Mainland be carried
on U.S.-flagged bottoms. Thus the cost of shipping to Puerto Rico is commonly
nearly double that of nearby islands, whose use of foreign-flagged ships is not
restricted.139 Because the cost of transporting on U.S. merchant vessels is the high-
investors resources/introduction.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) ("Public bonds
of Puerto Rico are held mainly by U.S. mainland investors. . . .").
133. See GOBIERNO DE PUERTO RiCO OFICIANA DEL GOBERNADOR JUNTA DE
PLANIFICACION [hereinafteR PUERTO Rico PLANNING BD.], Impacto de Sector Externo
en la Economia de Puerto Rico, in INFORME ECONOMICO GOBERNADOR 1995, at 12
(1996).
134. PUERTO Rico PLANNING BD., La Distribucion Functional del Ingreso Neto en Puerto
Rico, in INFORME ECONOMICO GOBERNADOR1995, at 2 (1996).
135. The current Puerto Rican unemployment rate of 14.7% is 5% higher than any U.S.
state, or even the recently bankrupt city of Detroit, Michigan. See U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-13-2394, NEws RELEASE: REGIONAL AND
STATE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT - NOVEMBER 2013, at 11 tbl.3 (2013) (com-
paring Puerto Rico's November 2013 unemployment rate of 14.7% against that of
the highest states, Nevada and Rhode Island at 9.0%, and the city of Detroit, Mich-
igan at 9.3%); Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Puerto Rico, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/ LASST 4 3000003 (last visited Aug. 27, 2013) (showing
that in the last ten years Puerto Rico's unemployment rate has ranged as high at
16.9% and never dropped below 1o%).
136. The poverty level by U.S. standards was about 45% of the population in 20o and
2011. See ALEMAYEHU BISHAw, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 2010 AND 2011, at 3
tbl.i (2012).
137. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 126, at 64.
138. Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261 § 27, 41 Stat. 988, 999.
139. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 132, at 13 ("It costs an estimated $3,063 to




est in the world, residents of Puerto Rico pay significantly higher prices for im-
ported goods, which makes the Puerto Rican economy suffer. 4o As a result,
Puerto Rico is the main subsidizer of the U.S. merchant fleet, receiving 21.7% Of
all U.S.-flag shipments even though it has only 1% of the U.S. population.141
The existence of high unemployment and low wages as compared to main-
land United States has also forced a large number of Puerto Ricans to migrate to
the mainland.4 ' This diaspora has resulted in more than four million Puerto Ri-
cans'43-more than are living in Puerto Rico'"-spread throughout almost every
state in the Union. Ironically, as promoted by Chief Justice Taft in Balzac, there
they are entitled to the rights denied to them in Puerto Rico. These same factors
of high unemployment and low wages have also led large numbers of Puerto Ri-
cans to look to the U.S. Armed Forces for employment. In this way, the direct
effects of colonialism on the Puerto Rican economy enact further, secondary
costs on the Puerto Rican populace: Puerto Ricans have served in every war since
the First World War in disproportionate numbers to the rest of the nation and
have suffered casualties accordingly.'4
Coast of the United States to Puerto Rico; the same shipment costs $1,504 to nearby
Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and $1,687 to Kingston (Jamaica)-desti-
nations that are not subject to Jones Act restrictions.").
140. Id. at 13 & n.34; see WORLD BANK, ECONOMY PROFILE: PUERTO Rico (U.S.) at 75
fig.9.1.
141. GONZALEZ, supra note 119, at 251.
142. See THE PUERTO RICAN DIASPORA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Carmen Teresa
Whalen & Victor Vazquez-Hernandez eds., 2005).
143. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., HISPANICS OF PUERTO RICAN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES,
2009, at 1-2 (2011).
144. Kevin Mead, PR Population Below 3.7M; Income, Poverty Hold, CARIBBEAN BUS.
(Sept. 20, 2013, 10:2o AM), http://www.caribbeanbusinesspr.com/news/census
-pr-population-falls-below-3.7m-income-poverty- rates-hold-89054.html.
145. Puerto Ricans have served in the U.S. armed forces since March 2, 1899, when Con-
gress authorized the organization of a "native" battalion, the "Puerto Rican Battal-
ion of Volunteer Infantry." In 1917, two months after the passage of the Jones Act
granting Puerto Ricans citizenship, the President, by decree, extended the Selective
Service Act to Puerto Rico. Since that time, Puerto Ricans have served in significant
numbers in all major U.S. wars and conflicts, including more than 65,000 who
served in World War II, but have suffered casualty rates at times surpassing many
mainland states. In Korea, for example, Puerto Rico's casualty rate was one per 600
inhabitants, significantly higher than the one per 1,125 person rate of the continental
United States. See generally Luis R. Divila Col6n, The Blood Tax: The Puerto Rican
Contribution to the United States War Effort, 40 REV. COL. ABOG. P.P.R. 603 (1979)
(listing figures). Puerto Rico's contribution to the U.S. military continues to date,
with more than 300 service members having lost their life in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iraq Coalition Casualties: U.S. Wounded Totals, ICASUALTIES.ORG, http:/
87
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
There is another aspect to the impact of the military on Puerto Rico and its
colonial status. The United States' original interest in Puerto Rico was mainly
strategic; by annexing Puerto Rico, it acquired deep-water naval ports and coal-
ing stations from which to control the Southern approaches to the United States
and, later on, from which to defend the Panama Canal. With United States bases
in Puerto Rico and Panama-as well as in Guantimamo Bay'4 and the U.S. Virgin
Islands-the Caribbean Sea became a U.S. lake. As time progressed through the
First and Second World Wars, the Cold War, and other undeclared wars, con-
flicts, and police actions, Puerto Rico-notwithstanding its limited land area-
became a virtual military camp. Proportionately, more land in Puerto Rico was
occupied for these purposes than in any other U.S. jurisdiction, to the tune of
14% of the island's land.147 The West and East ends of Puerto Rico became major
military complexes, the West with a strategic bomber base at Ramey Field that
had one of the longest runways in the world,"' and the East with the largest naval
complex outside the continental United States at Roosevelt Roads.149 At two off-
shore civilian-inhabited island-municipalities, Vieques and Culebra, the U.S.
Navy conducted air and naval bombardments as well as amphibious operations
for nearly sixty years, notwithstanding decades of opposition by successive local
governments.5 o
When, because of mounting local opposition, the Navy finally discontinued
its bombing operations in 1999, it retaliated by closing down all of its bases in
Puerto Rico almost overnight, causing a major disruption to the island's econ-
omy.15' Perhaps even more egregious, however, was the Navy's refusal to ade-
quately clean up and rectify the environmental, ecological, and health damage
that its operations had caused to the island's 9,ooo plus civilian residents.15 Not-
licasualties.org/Iraq/USCasualtiesByState.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2013); Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals, ICASUALTIES.ORG, http://
icasualties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesBy State.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
146. Recently, some 125 Puerto Rican military police were sent to Guantinamo to serve
as reinforcements at the detention center there. See U.S. Sends 125 Troops to Guan-
tanamo from Puerto Rico, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD, June 5, 2013, http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2o13/o6/o5/125-us-troops-sent-to-guantanamo-n_3390907
.html.
147. GONZALEZ, supra note 119, at 252.
148. Evelyn Guadalupe-Fajardo, Raising Ramey, P.R. HERALD, July 31, 2003.
149. KATHERINE T. MCCAFFREY, MILITARY POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST: THE U.S. NAVY
IN VIEQUES, PUERTO RICo 11-12 (2002).
150. See Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 20o6).
151. Matthew Hay Brown, Base Closure Hurts Town, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 1, 2005.
152. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 149.
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withstanding compelling evidence that this damage has taken place and contin-
ues unabated, Congress has turned a deaf ear on the pleas of these politically de-
fenseless citizens, and so have the Courts of the United States. 53
Had Puerto Rico and its resident U.S. citizens not been subjected to a colo-
nial regime, but instead granted even a modicum of political power, these abuses
would not have gone on unattended. When similar situations have arisen in the
various states-such as in Massachusetts's offshore islands, California's Channel
Islands, or Hawaii-their political power has been brought to bear to correct the
harms to the environment and to the civilian population caused by such opera-
tions. Given this long history of economic subjugation and dependency, it is dif-
ficult to argue that the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico have not been, and are not
being, exploited in what is a classic colonial relationship.5 4
C. The Cultural Manifestations of Puerto Rico's Colonial Relationship
In addition to the political and economic manifestations resulting from the
relationship of Puerto Rico to the United States-both of which exhibit flagrant
inequality and dependencies that are hallmark indicators of colonialism-the
Puerto Rican citizenry visibly bears the effects of this colonial relationship, as
manifested through their culture and identity.
In its broadest sense, "culture" includes not only the intellectual and artistic
contributions of a people, but more generally the whole scope of their knowledge,
beliefs, morals, customs, opinions, religions, superstitions, and art forms."'5 The
existence of a "Puerto Rican culture" has been the subject of long and intense
debate.1"6 Whether Puerto Rican culture existed at the time of the change in sov-
ereignty in a definitional sense, however, is ultimately irrelevant. The fact is that
a substantial segment of the population had beliefs and values that made them
sufficiently different and cohesive to give them a reasonable basis for believing
that there was such a thing as a "Puerto Rican culture." These elements included
some of the very factors that have already been described as underlying the Insu-
lar Cases: race, language, religion, and ethnicity. Puerto Ricans also looked to
Spain as their "mother country" in terms of culture and tradition, notwithstand-
ing their admiration of the United States' democratic institutions, to which they
aspired and reasonably sought access to upon becoming citizens.
153. See SAnchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F-3d 86 (1st Cir. 2012).
154. See GONZALEZ, supra note 119, at 250.
155. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552 (1981).
156. See Sidney W. Mintz, Puerto Rico: An Essay in the Definition of Culture, in STATUS
OF PUERTO Rico: SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES 339 (1966); cf Jos6 Luis Gonzalez,
Identidad y Didspora en la Realidad Puerto rriquena, EL NUEVO DIA, Aug. 21, 1983, at
6, 8, 10.
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Although the cultural influence of the United States on Puerto Rico's society
is pervasive,157 in a sense part of this influence is not much different than what
has happened throughout the rest of the world. Consider the presence of McDon-
ald's in France and China or the spread of U.S.-inspired modern popular music
as two admittedly superficial examples. In the case of Puerto Rico, however, there
is an opposite reaction to this phenomenon: the development of a vigorous, au-
tochthonous, and nationalistically-tinged movement in the arts, music, and lit-
erature-stronger and more pervasive than at any time during the 400 years of
Spanish colonial presence on the island.5'
The issue of cultural colonialism is, in fact, a much more complex one. Franz
Fanon, the French psychiatrist and theorist of the Algerian independence move-
ment, wrote:
[C]olonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip
and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of
perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts,
disfigures, and destroys it .... [T]he effect consciously sought by colo-
nialism [is] to drive into the natives' heads the idea that if the settlers
were to leave, they would at once fall back into barbarism, degradation
and bestiality.59
Obviously the French colonial policies in Algeria were exponentially more ex-
treme than the U.S. colonial policies and administration of Puerto Rico. Still, the
United States' "Americanization" campaign in Puerto Rico, beginning in 1898
and lasting into the late 1940s,"'o focused on the implicit notion that everything
"American" was superior and was purposely aimed at downgrading, if not erad-
icating, Spanish as Puerto Rico's vernacular.'"' This campaign undermined
Puerto Rico's cultural self-esteem and fully impacted several generations of
Puerto Ricans, with lasting effects to this day. These effects have been poignantly
described by Gordon Lewis in his perceptive analysis of the cultural dilemma in
Puerto Rico:
American occupation and control have left a very real colonial psychol-
ogy in the Puerto Rican people. There is a militant self-defensiveness, a
resentment of condescension, a proud assertion of puertorriqueiismo.
These traits explain a number of phenomena: the search in politics for a
157. See, e.g., PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO (2004).
158. See, e.g., id. at 106-12.
159. FRANz FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 210-11 (1965).
160. See TORRUELLA, supra note 3, at 261.
161. Id. at 215-16; Ismael Rodriguez Bou, Significant Factors in the Development of Edu-
cation in Puerto Rico, in STATUS OF PUERTO RICo: SELECTED BACKGROUND STUDIES
153, supra note 156. But see JUAN JOSE OSUNA, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN PUERTO




constitutional status which will yield the dignity of separate insular iden-
tity as it also preserves the privileges of American citizenship, the effort
to discover a special native "character" and personality, the emergence
of a cultural nationalism seeking to preserve the "purity" of the home
language against the vulgarities of American idiom.'
The "neither fish nor fowl" predicament that the Insular Cases entrenched in
the United States-Puerto Rico relationship has manifested itself in Puerto Rican
society through a deep ambivalence and insecurity as to their identity as a peo-
ple-not only in the broader international sense but more specifically within the
United States' national polity. Although the colonial administration of Puerto
Rico by the United States undoubtedly made tremendous advances in the physi-
cal health 6 3 and education'4 of the island's population, it is in the area of mental
health that Puerto Rican citizens have been most negatively affected by Puerto
Rico's colonial condition.
It has been argued in both scientific and non-scientific literature that the
perception of political and cultural inferiority can be linked to mental illness."'
Studies have shown that the residents of Puerto Rico suffer over three times more
mental, psychoneurotic, and personality disorders than the average United States
population,"' with schizophrenia historically being the most treated psychosis
on the island.6 As stated by Dr. Hector H. Bird in a paper presented before the
American Academy of Psychoanalysis:
162. Gordon K. Lewis, Puerto Rico: A Case Study of Change in an Underdeveloped Area,
17 J. POL. 614, 616 (1955).
163. See TORRUELLA, supra note 43, at 206 tbl.3, 2o8 tbl. 4 , 217-22.
164. Id. at 209-17.
165. See Hector R. Bird, The Cultural Dichotomy of Colonial People, io J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 195 (1982); Mintz, supra note 156, at 339-435; see also 2 Hearings
Before the U.S.-P.R. Comm'n on the Status of P.R., 89th Cong. 397-426 (testimonies
of Dr. Hernfm Padilla and Rafael Correa Corona); Michael Woodbury, Mental
Health and the Quality of Life in Puerto Rico, 6 PLERUS 1, 10, 24-25 (1977); cf Blanca
Fernandez-Pol, Culture and Psychopathology: A Study of Puerto Ricans, 137 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 724 (1980) (providing evidence of a connection between decreased ad-
herance to Latin American family values and psychiatric morbidity in Puerto Rican
patients).
166. See Jaime F. Pou, Special Communication: Diagnostic Patterns in Disability in Puerto
Rico and the United States, 68 BOLLETIN DE LA ASOCIACION MEDICA DE PUERTO Rico
224 (1976).
167. See TORRUELLA,supra note 43, at 222 & n.814. Of all U.S. jurisdictions in which Social
Security benefits are paid, Puerto Rico has the highest percentage of recipients
claiming mood disorders as the grounds for relief (33.3%), followed by Massachu-
setts (22.8%), and New Hampshire (22.2%). See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 13-11827,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE
PROGRAM, 2011, at 43-44 tbl.ii.A.
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The . .. state of Puerto Rican society is one of identity diffusion and
identity confusion ... Numerous social indicators reflect the depth and
breadth of the Puerto Rican crisis and suggest a collectivity in a state of
psychological disintegration. Criminality is rampant, divorce rates are
among the highest in the world, as are the rates of alcoholism and drug
abuse, and the high incidence of psychopathology and emotional mal-
function .... We do not mean to imply that identity conflicts are the
sole explanation for all of Puerto Rico's social ills. Such a highly complex
situation is evidently multidetermined and a host of other factors con-
tribute (such as overpopulation, the stress of repeated uprootings in the
pattern of back-and-forth migration, rapid social change, and so forth).
But many of these factors are directly or indirectly related to the colonial
status and the absence of the aforementioned "mutually supportive psy-
chosocial equilibrium" to which identity conflicts contribute.'
Juan Gonzalez, in his masterful study of the United States' troubled history
with its Latino citizens, issued a stronger indictment of the effects of the century's
old colonial relationship of the United States on Puerto Ricans:
[A] dependent mentality toward government, pessimism about one's
ability to change the future, self-hatred, and self-deprecation have be-
come ingrained in too many Puerto Ricans.... They are symptoms of a
more deep-rooted malady-the structure of colonialism itself. How else
could the U.S. government justify to its people the continued possession
of a colony except by cultivating an image of Puerto Ricans as helpless
and unable to care for themselves?"9
There should be little doubt that the political, economic and cultural mani-
festations of the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico clearly
demonstrate that Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States, grievously scarred
by the pervasive effects of that colonial relationship.
V. THE COLONIAL STATUS OF PUERTO Rico Is UNAUTHORIZED BY THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND CONTRAVENES THE LAW OF THE LAND AS MANIFESTED IN
BINDING TREATIES ENTERED INTO BY THE UNITED STATES
There is nothing in the text of the Constitution that can support the mainte-
nance of colonies by the United States. Furthermore, nothing in the Federalist
Papers promotes such a practice, let alone mentions the word "colony." This is
not surprising given that the War for Independence was fought to escape such a
condition. At a minimum, it would have been unusual-not to say unethical-
for those who had just fought a grueling war to end colonial rule to authorize
such a practice in their new fundamental document. Although, as discussed pre-
viously, territorial expansion was surely contemplated, the historical practice and
168. See Bird, supra note 165, at 204-05.




constitutional jurisprudence clearly document that it was aimed only at the cre-
ation of new States or the temporary acquisition of territory destined for state-
hood. The Insular Cases constitute a deviant aberration from this constitutional
and historic practice that is today as unsustainable as would be the reinstallation
of the practices of racial discrimination sanctioned by Plessy.
Furthermore, the United States' failure to take steps to correct the present
condition of national disenfranchisement of millions of U.S. citizens residing in
Puerto Rico, as well as citizens in the other U.S. territories and possessions, is in
clear violation of several treaties to which the United States is a signatory.7 o In
particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which the United States ratified in 1992, provides that "[aIll peoples have the right
of self-determination" and "[b]y virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status.""' Article 25 of the ICCPR establishes that:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity. . .
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives, [and]
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage . . . .7
By ratifying this treaty, the United States undertook "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights rec-
ognized in the [ICCPR], without distinction of any kind" 17 and to "take whatever
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of
the [ICCPR], to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the [ICCPR]."17 4 Most importantly, the
United States is under the affirmative obligation "[tlo ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as recognized [in the ICCPR] are violated shall have an
effective remedy."175 Additionally, the treaty sets forth a further requirement "[t] o
ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto deter-
mined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedies."76
At the time of ratification, the United States made the affirmative represen-
tation to the more than one hundred other states that had also signed the ICCPR,
170. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
171. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 1(i).
172. Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
173. Id. art. 2(1).
174. Id. art. 2(2).
175. Id. art. 2(3)(a) (emphasis added).
176. Id. art. 2( 3 )(b) (emphasis added).
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that "existing U.S. law generally [already] complies with the [ICCPR]; hence, im-
plementing legislation is not contemplated."7 It also made the representation
that, "[ in general, the substantive provisions of the [ICCPR] are consistent with
the letter and spirit of the United States Constitution and laws, both state and
federal."'78
These declarations of compliance were clearly without a basis in fact or law.
The United States is not only in unquestioned violation of the provisions of the
ICCPR. It has also taken no action to comply with the obligations it assumed
thereunder. Further, it has actively and vehemently opposed every attempt by
U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico to seek judicial relief in the courts of the
United States to rectify these violations. These courts, in fact, have rejected all
attempts to seek validation of the individual rights established by the ICCPR, al-
lowing the United States the benefit of various judicially legislated legal subter-
fuges which stand on par with the actions of the Court in Plessy and the Insular
Cases in their lack of constitutional support.'79 Critically, United States courts
have refused to allow individuals to enforce the provisions of the ICCPR, relying
on the theory that it is not self-executing. But this treaty has been duly ratified by
the Senate, and therefore it is unquestionably the Law of the Land, requiring the
United States to comply with its provisions irrespective of whether an appropri-
ate personal cause of action exists to enforce them.
CONCLUSION
An elaborate or extensive conclusion is not needed. What is in order is plain
speaking: Puerto Rico is a colony of the United States populated by 3.9 million
U.S. citizens. Its colonial status has had serious and deleterious effects on Puerto
Rico's political equality, economic vitality, and cultural identity. These pervasive
effects have continued unabated for over a century, as Congress and the U.S.
courts have turned a blind eye.
The Constitution does not authorize the United States to hold territory or its
citizens in such a condition; the Insular Cases and Balzac validated this colonial
status in direct contravention of the words and values of the Constitution. These
cases were wrongly decided ab initio. In addition to violating the Constitution,
Puerto Rico's colonial status contravenes the Law of the Land as defined by the
United States' international treaty commitments. The failure to rectify this state
of affairs not only abrogates constitutional and legal traditions; it denigrates the
177. S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992).
178. Id. at io.
179. See Igartia-De la Rosa v. United States, 417 F-3d 145, 149 (1st Cir. 2005) (" [Nlone of
these treaties comprises domestic law of the United States and so their status fur-
nishes the clearest ground for denying declaratory relief"); Juan R. Torruella, The
Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L




nation and downgrades United States society. The time is long since past for the
Supreme Court to correct the errors that it created.so
180. There are any number of proposed legislative and political "solutions" to Puerto
Rico's current status, ranging from statehood to independence. Beyond the aca-
demic realm, the proper relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is
a source of constant and passionate debate within the Puerto Rican political system,
where opinions are shaped by the experiences of constituents who face, daily, the
implications of Puerto Rico's colonial status. Equally important, there is hardly
unanimity within the United States' ruling political circles about what to do with
Puerto Rico and its U.S. citizen population. A less discussed, but I believe crucial,
part of this equation is role of the U.S. citizenry more generally. These citizens often
hold disparate opinions about Puerto Rico-ranging from total indifference or ig-
norance to vehemently-held views-usually based on experiences with Stateside
Puerto Ricans. See, e.g., David Royston Patterson, WillPuerto Rico Be America's 51ST
State?, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sun-
day/wil-puerto-rico-be-americas-51st-state.html; Press Release, Angus Reid Public
Opinion, Americans Warming Up to Idea of Puerto Rico Becoming 51st State (Dec.
5, 2012), http://www.angusreidglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2012.12.05
_PuertoRicoUSA.pdf.
My intent with this Article is not to champion any proposed solution over an-
other. In fact, understanding the crucial problem identified herein requires setting
aside individual beliefs about the appropriateness of particular legislative or politi-
cal action. This is because-whatever the future relationship of Puerto Rico and the
United States may be-reaching that solution requires first recognizing the consti-
tutionally untenable nature of their current, colonial relation. I call here not for any
particular change, but only for the recognition and rejection of Supreme Court
precedent that flies directly in face of the constitutional principles of the United
States. Only when the fallacy of this precedent is revealed and rejected by the Court
will the political system have the proper impetus to craft a solution of any nature.
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